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The role of special advisers should be clarified and there
must be more transparency about their work
The seemingly nebulous and underhand role of special advisers has featured prominently in
many of the government’s recent scandals – most recently in the case of Adam Smith and
the handling of the Newscorps bid for BSkyB. Martin Smith argues that the problem is not
their existence per se, but a lack of clarity about what they do and transparency about how
they do it. 
Since special advisers were f irst introduced in the 1970s they have regularly hit the
headlines. Under Margaret Thatcher, special advisers were seen as a mechanism f or providing the prime
minister with advice to counter her departmental ministers.  Ult imately this led to a clash between her
adviser Alan Walters and the Chancellor Nigel Lawson resulting in Lawson’s resignation. Under Blair
special advisers were seen as developing an alternative civil service that engendered sof a government.
Special advisers were of ten the f rontline troops in the battle between Blair and Brown f ighting their war
by proxy. Two of  Brown’s special advisers Charlie Wheelen and Damien McBride had to resign because of
their activit ies in releasing dif f erent types of  inf ormation.
Special advisers are seen of ten as blocking the civil service or over polit icising government. At the same
time the lack of  special advisers in Number 10 is seen a f actor of  the ‘omnishambles’ of  the coalit ion
government. It is argued that by lacking suf f icient polit ical antennae in Number 10 policy mistakes have
been allowed to happen.
Special advisers were recently back in the news again with the resignation of  Adam Smith who, as Jeremy
Hunt’s special adviser, was f orced to take the blame f or inappropriate contacts with News International
at a t ime when the minister was acting in a ‘quasi- judicial’ role. Within this context, the Public
Administration Committee is undertaking an inquiry into special advisers because they seem to be a
recurrent problem within the Brit ish polity.
Special advisers do raise a number of  issues but generally the questions they raise are more to do with
the overall operation of  Brit ish government than the role and activity of  special advisers per se. In a
sense, it is not the bad examples that we need to examine but the everyday operations of  ministers and
their advisers. What is clear is that it has been easy to blame special advisers when things go wrong.
Special advisers have a particular, but ill-def ined, role in government. It can range f rom being bag carriers
and door openers (or f amously taking the empty yoghurt pot f rom Peter Mandelson) to being people
who are right at the centre of  No.10 policy and presentation as in the case of  Alastair Campbell or Steve
Hilton. Of ten they can be a key mechanism in supporting the process of  government by ensuring that the
wishes of  ministers are known within the department and in enabling a minister to have access to a wider
range of  advice than would be the case if  there was a simple reliance on the civil service.
The problem is not the existence of  special advisers but a lack of  clarity about what they do and
transparency about how they do it. We have to be clear that special advisers are patronage, and not
open, appointments and theref ore the minister has to be responsible f or their appointment and their
role. At the same time they are working within government and employed as temporary civil servants
which means that the Permanent Secretary should have some oversight into their activit ies. There are
suggestions that special advisers could be paid f or by a separate f und making them party employees
rather than temporary civil servants. Such an arrangement would blur f urther the lines of  accountability
and ef f ectively increase their autonomy.
Already we have seen that one of  the issues with special advisers is that they provide ministers with
deniability. It was the def ence of  both Gordon Brown and Jeremy Hunt in the case of  Damon McBride and
Adam Smith respectively. The Ministers claimed that they did not know or authorise the activit ies of  the
special adviser and so it was the adviser who took the blame. Of  course, this posit ion is
untenable. Special advisers are the ministers eyes and ears, they are there to do his or her bidding and
they have no independent existence.
For minister ’s to deny their responsibility is actually to undermine the system of  special advisers;
it places the special advisers in an indef inable space and creates the lack of  clarity about their quasi-
of f icial status. The posit ion needs to be that special advisers are an adjunct to the minister. They are
there to work f or the minister and the minister is responsible f or their actions. An adviser is responsible
to the government as a whole in the way the minister is bound by collective responsibility.
The other issue that is f requently raised in relation to special advisers is the numbers in government.
There is a widely shared view that the under the Blair government there were too many. And, of  course,
with too many there is the danger of  a shadow civil service; which would be an ad hoc shif t to a more
polit icised system of  policy advice.
Clearly, the growth in special advisers in Number 10 under Blair gave the prime minister a policy capacity
that had not previously existed and that created the potential f or conf lict with departments and
departmental of f icials. Yet, the number of  special advisers in the Brit ish system in low compared to other
Westminster- like systems. Indeed, in a way the issue is not numbers; it is in def ining the role of  special
advisers and realising that it may be appropriate to have more advisers in the Home Of f ice than in
DEFRA.
We need to do get away f rom the hyperbole surrounding special advisers. They are not Svengalis or a
parallel civil service. But, there does need to be more clarity about their roles and more transparency
about their work. They provide a usef ul role in providing ministers with a wider range of  advice than the
tradit ional civil service. Like much else within the Brit ish polity, they have developed in an ad hoc way
without any ref lection about where they sit within the Whitehall machine.
Yet the problems when they occur are usually problems of  behaviour rather than rules and it is bad
behaviour that grabs attention. Moreover, in most cases the issues of  controversy have been around
external media advice rather than policy advice. The vast majority of  special advisers get on with their
work quietly and work well within departments with both ministers and of f icials. If  we had more
transparency about their work there would probably be less controversy, and polit icians and the media
could look f or someone else to blame.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the British Politics and Policy blog,
nor of the London School of Economics. Please read our comments policy before posting.
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